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PROSECUTING AL QAEDA:
AMERICA'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY INTERESTS ARE
BEST SERVED BY TRYING TERRORISTS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
Anton L. Janik,Jr.*
The basic proposition here is that somebody who comes into the United States of
America illegally, who conducts a terrorist operation killing thousands of innocent
Americans, men, women, and children, is not a lawful combatant. They don't
deserve to be treated as a prisoner of war. They don't deserve the same guarantees
and safeguards that would be used for an American citizen going through the
normal judicial process... [T]hey will have a fair trial, but it'll be under the
procedures of a military tribunal and rules and regulations to be established in
connection with that... We think [it] guarantees that we'll have the kind of
treatment of these individuals that we believe they deserve. '

"Bush [has] undermined the anti-terroristcoalition, ceding to nations overseas the
high moral and legal ground long held by US. justice. And on what leg does the
to death after a military trial
US now stand when China sentences an American
2
devoid of counsel chosen by the defendant?"
INTRODUCTION

In this paper, the competing reasons for prosecuting foreign terrorists under
tribunals, be they domestic, foreign, international, military, or a combination of the
above, are explored. A focus is specifically given to the efforts being taken against
the al Qaeda militants detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.3 U.S. foreign policy
and international human rights concerns are juxtaposed against the public desire
•Juris Doctor expected May 2003, University of Denver College of Law. Bachelor of Arts (Russian),
Middlebury College, 1995.
1.Vice President Dick Cheney, Remarks at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Nov. 14, 2001),
availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20011114-1.html.
2. William Satire, Editorial, A Rush to Bogus Justice: The Bush Administration'sSecret Military
Tribunals Will Backfire in the Battle Against Terrorism, PIrr. POST-GAZETTE,Nov. 27,2001, at A 1l.
3. According to President Bush, al Qaeda militants are responsible for the September I 1 attacks
on the U.S. See George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People
(Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.htm

("Who attacked our country? The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely
affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda. They are the same murderers indicted for bombing
American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and responsible for bombing the USS Cole.").

2002

PROSECUTING AL QAEDA

for retribution in the wake of the September 1 th attacks, and the question of
whether the U.S. is better served by prosecuting foreign terrorists under
international tribunals is discussed.
Section I provides an introduction to military tribunal terminology and
procedure. Section II describes the history of the international military tribunal as
created in 1945, the use of foreign national tribunals, the International Court of
Justice, and the rise of the International Criminal Court. Section III discusses both
the history of domestic military tribunals and President Bush's military tribunals4
plan. Section IV discusses the arguments for and against applying either
international legal or U.S. constitutional protections to al Qaeda. Section V
addresses whether America's foreign policy interests are best served by
prosecuting al Qaeda members in U.S. military tribunals or under an international
tribunal. The conclusion follows in Section VI.

I. AN INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY TRIBUNAL TERMINOLOGY AND PROCEDURE
In its most traditional form, a military tribunal is a war-time judicial
proceeding "used to try violations of the laws of war."' According to the Bush
Administration, the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center complex,
the Pentagon, and on Flight 93, grounded in Pennsylvania, constitute "acts of
war," 6 and attacks on innocent persons, a violation of the laws of war. The Bush
Administration has determined that the culprits of those attacks
are a "collection of
'7
loosely-associated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda.
President Bush, under both his power and authority as the Commander-InChief of the military as provided by Article II of the U.S. Constitution, and under
Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, has the power to convene
military tribunals. 8 Under U.S. law, the Supreme Court permits the use of military
tribunals against non-citizens unless, under the Geneva Convention, those

4. Much ado was made about the naming of these proceedings. Under President Bush's Military
Order, see infra note 109, they were originally termed "military tribunals." Upon the Department of
Justice's release of the procedural rules, the name was changed to "Military Commissions." See Order
No. 1, infra note 125. This paper will refer to historical military tribunals, as well as the proceedings
established following the mandate set forth in President Bush's Military Order, as "military tribunals."
5. See DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Fact Sheet: Department of Defense Order on Military Commissions,
availableat http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321 fact.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2002).
See also Tribunals Break Sharply From Civilian Courts, at http://www.cnn.comt2OOlILAWl12/06/
inv.tribunals.explainer/index.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
6. See Remarks by the President In Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team,
availableat http:/lwww.whitehouse.govlnewslreleasesl200l/09/20010912-4.html (last vistited Feb. 18,
2002) ("The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were
more than acts of terror. They were acts of war."); George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of
Congress and the American People, supra note 3 ("On September the 1 th, enemies of freedom
committed an act of war against our country."). See also Keith Johnson and Carlta Vitzthum,
EuropeansMake Case Against Use of Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28,2001, at A12.
7. George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (Sept. 20,
2001), supra note 3.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 109-114.
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defendants are considered "prisoners of war." 9 However, the Supreme Court does
not restrict military tribunals to use against non-citizens: in Ex parte Milligan, the
Supreme Court held that U.S. citizens may be tried by military tribunals, but only
if civilian courts are "not open."'0
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United
Nations requires that military tribunals be fundamentally fair." Among the Civil
and Political Rights Covenant's requirements, a military tribunal must ensure a
"fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by law,"' 2 and provide the defendant with the presumption of
innocence.13 The defendant must be informed "promptly and in detail in a language
which he understands. .. the nature and cause of the charge against him."'14 The
provisions require that the defendant have counsel chosen by him, 15 be able to face
and challenge his accuser, 16 have the right to remain silent,1 7 and have the right to
appeal.' 8 President Bush's military tribunal plan, discussed in section III, below,
substantially meets those criteria.' 9

9. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 n.14 (1950) ("We are not holding that these
prisoners have no right which the military authorities are bound to respect. The United States, by the
Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, concluded with forty-six other countries, including
the German Reich, an agreement upon the treatment to be accorded captives. These prisoners claim to
be and are entitled to its protection. It is, however, the obvious scheme of the Agreement that
responsibility for observance and enforcement of these rights is upon political and military authorities.
Rights of alien enemies are vindicated under it only through protests and intervention of protecting
powers as the rights of our citizens against foreign governments are vindicated only by Presidential
intervention."); see id. at 785 ("[T]he Constitution does not confer a right of personal security or an
immunity from military trial and punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile service of a
government at war with the United States.... the Military Commission is a lawful tribunal to adjudge
enemy offenses against the laws of war.").
10. See Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 125-27 (1866) ("If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the
courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on
the theatre of active military operations, where war really prevail, there is a necessity to furnish a
substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society; and as
no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by marital rule until the laws can have their free
course." Id. at 127.). See also Tribunals Break Sharply From Civilian Courts, at http://www.cnn.
com/2001/LAW/12/06/inv.tribunals.explaner/index.htnlm (last visited Jan. 13, 2002).
11. See InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, art. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter "Civil and Political Rights
Covenant"]; Universal Declarationof Human Rights, at art. IX,G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doe. A/810
at 71 (1948) ("Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against
him."). See also TribunalsBreak Sharplyfrom Civilian Courts, supra note 10.
12. See Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 14(1).
13. See id. at art. 14(2).
14. See id. at art. 14(3)(a).
15. See id. at art. 14(3)(d).
16. See id. at art. 14(3)(e).
17. See id. at art. 14(3)(g).
18. See id. at art. 14(5).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 109-142.
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II. FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL USAGE

A. A BriefHistory of Foreignand InternationalMilitary Tribunal Usage
Military tribunals have an extensive history, having occurred over a span of
time that ranges at least 2500 years.20 With such an extensive history, one may
wonder just what the attraction is. Perhaps the answer is that, historically, the
military provided the only means to conduct such a proceeding. However, as
discussed below, military tribunals offer one very attractive benefit: the ability to
publicly bring an adversary war power's leaders to justice.
Quite often, that
2
application ofjustice involves employing the death penalty. '
The first known use of a military tribunal occurred in 405 B.C., after the
destruction of the Athenian fleet at Aegospotamos.22 According to the ancient
historian Xenophon, the Lacedaemonian admiral Lysander called a meeting of his
allies to determine the fate of the vanquished Athenians.23 The Athenians were
accused of several war crimes, and were summarily executed.24
A more modem use of the military tribunal was seen during the Middle Ages.
These tribunals were distinguished from earlier ones because here, trials were
actually held. In 1474, Sir Peter of Hagenbach, made Governor of Breisach by the
conquering Duke Charles of Burgundy, was captured and tried for war crimes he
committed in the town of Breisach.25 Hagenbach argued that he was not to blame;
he merely acted under the orders of his commanding officer. Hagenbach's
"superior orders" defense fell upon deaf ears: he was sentenced to death and
executed.26
One popular nineteenth century example occurred when Napoleon Bonaparte,
after his escape from exile in Elba, returned to France leading an army.27 He was
subsequently captured and tried. Under the terms of the prior Congress of Vienna's
Declaration of March 13, 1815, Napoleon had been declared an outlaw and subject
to any actions that the Allied powers deemed appropriate.2 8 Placed in custody of
the British Government, Napoleon was again exiled, this time to St. Helena.29
While not an example employing execution, this does provide precedent for the
applicability of a military tribunal's use to try an adversary's most senior leader.

20.
21.
22.
23.

See
See
See
See

infra text accompanying note 22.
infra text accompanying notes 24-26.
ROBERT K. WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (1962).
id.
24. Id. See also PLUTARCH, LivEs OF THE NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS I (John Dryden, trans.)
(1992).
25. See WOETZEL, supra note 22, at 19-20.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 23.
28. See id.
29. See id.
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B. The Rise ofForeign andInternationalMilitary Tribunals
The use of international military tribunals has its genus in the various peace
treaties signed in 1919, at the end of World War I. Article 227 of the Treaty of
Versailles provided for a special tribunal composed of judges from the U.S., Great
Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, to try William II, the former German Emperor,
for offenses "against international morality and the sanctity of treaties. ' 30 Under
that Treaty's Article 228, provisions were included for military tribunals of
German individuals accused of "having committed acts in violation of the laws and
customs of war.",3' The Treaty of Saint-Germain-En-Laye 32 provided similarly for
the Austrians, the Treaty of Neuilly-Sur-Seine 33 for the Bulgarians, the Treaty of
Trianon 34 for the Hungarians, and the Treaty of Sevres 35 for the Turks. Pursuant to
the Treaty of Versailles, the Allied powers submitted a list of 896 individuals to be
handed over for trial.36 Concerns over a renewed war between Germany and the
Allies, or a civil war in Germany, however, led to the abandonment of the
requirement that Germany surrender those accused for trial.37
In 1945, following the end of World War II, international military tribunals
again arose, now as a means created "in the interests of the United Nations,, 38 to
try those responsible for both war crimes and crimes agairist humanity.3 9 The
Agreement... for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis [hereinafter the "London Agreement"],40 signed by
representatives from the U.S., the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and France,
formed the foundation for conducting the Nuremberg Trials. These trials were the
first actual historical precedent for the internationaltrial and punishment of war
criminals. 4 1 Nearly one year later, the first Nuremberg trial concluded.42 Twelve

30. See Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, art. 227.
31. Id. at art. 228.
32. See Treaty of Saint-Germain-En-Laye, Sept. 10, 1919, art. 173 etseq.
33. See Treaty of Neuilly-Sur-Seine, Nov. 27, 1919, art. 118 et seq.
34. See Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1920, art. 157 et seq.
35. See Treaty of Sevres, Aug. 10, 1920, art. 226 et seq.
36. See WOETZEL, supra note 22, at 3 1.
37. See JAMEs F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG 113 (1982).

38. London Agreement, infra note 40, at preambular paragraphs.
39. See V.N. Kudriavtsev, The Nuremberg Trial and Problems ofStrengthening the International
Legal Order, in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 4 (George Ginsburgs & V.N.

Kudriavtsev, eds. 1990). War crimes are "violations of the law and customs of war, and criminal acts
against the civilian population of occupied countries... crimes against peace and conspiracy to wage
aggressive war." See WOETZEL, supra note 22, at 6.
40. See Agreement by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional
Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945 [hereinafter the
"London Agreement"], available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtchart.htm (last
visited Jan. 27, 2002).
41. See WOETZEL, supra note 22, at 15.
42. See The Nuremberg Trials Chronology, at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/
nuremberg/NurembergChronology.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2002).
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defendants, including the Nazi's second-in-command,43 Herman G6ering, were
sentenced to death. 44 The defendants were executed two weeks later. 45 That same
year, international military tribunals were used to try Japanese for war crimes.46
Twenty-four of twenty-five defendants were convicted, including the Japanese
47
Prime Minister General Hideki Tojo, who was condemned to death and hung.
While the London Agreement permitted domestic trials, 48 they were not so
limited. The U.S. tried many foreign defendants under U.S. military commissions
conducted in the defendants' own countries. According to Deputy Defense
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, these foreign military tribunals were very successful:
"[I]n Germany, we prosecuted 1,672 individuals for war crimes before U.S.
military commissions. Convictions were obtained in 1,416 cases. In Japan, we tried
996 suspected war criminals before military commissions... 856 were
convicted. 49
Although the use of international tribunals was nearly dormant for the fifty
ensuing years, the 1990's again saw the convening of international tribunals. 50 This
time they were non-military tribunals, created under the auspices of the United
Nations Security Council, and were used to try defendants accused of genocide in
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.5 The next section describes their creation and use.
C. The InternationalCourt ofJustice and the Rise of the InternationalCriminal
Court

The International Court of Justice is the "principal judicial organ" of the

43. See Herman G6ering the Reichmarshall,at http://auschwitz.dk/Goering.htn (last visited Mar.
30, 2002).
44. The twelve defendants were Herman Wilhelm Goering, Joachim Von Ribbentrop, Wilhelm
Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Alfred Rosenburg, Hans Frank, Wilhem Frick, Julius Streicher, Fritz
Sauckel, Alfred Jodi, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, and Martin Bormann. See WOETZEL, supra note 22, at 7-12.
45. See id. at 15. Herman Goering committed suicide in his jail cell on October 15, 1946, the day
before the executions. Id.
46. See Key Tribunals, at http'J/www.cnn.com2OOlALAW/12/06Iinv.tribunals.timelinelindex.html
(last visited Jan 13, 2002).
47. Id.
48. While the international military tribunal was created to communally address the atrocities
committed against all nations, by war criminals "whose offenses have no particular geographic location,
whether they be accused individually or in their capacity as members of organizations or groups," both
the London Agreement's preamble and Article 6 allowed for trial by a single nation's courts. See
London Agreement, supra note 40, at art. 1. The London Agreement's preamble provides that parties
who have "been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in atrocities and crimes will be sent
back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and
punished .. . ." Id. at preambular paragraphs. Article 6 provides that the Agreement does not "prejudice
the jurisdiction or powers" of an individual nation to try war criminals in their own courts. Id. at art. 6.
49. See Jim Garamone, Wolfowitz Discusses Military Commissions Trying Terrorists, ARMED
FORCES PRESS SERV., available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec200l/n12132001_200112133.
html (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
50. See infra text accompanying note 58.
51. See id.
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53
United Nations.52 It was created in 1945 under the Charter of the United Nations,
with the primary aim of resolving disputes between U.N. member states.54
Accordingly, this "principal judicial organ" has no jurisdiction over matters
involving individual criminal responsibility. 55 However, on an ad hoc basis, the
United Nations has created tribunals to deal
with individual responsibility for the
56
crime of genocide, and other war crimes.

In 1993, the United Nations' Security Council established the International
Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 57 That tribunal was established with
the mandate of trying individuals accused of genocide and crimes against
humanity.5 8 The tribunal's primary defendant is the former Yugoslavian president
Slobodan Milosevic, whose trial began in February, 2002. 59 While charged with
both genocide and lesser crimes against humanity, in accordance with the United
Nations' stance on human rights, 60 even were Milosevic convicted on all counts,
the most severe sentence he could receive is life imprisonment. 61 In 1994, the
United Nations Security Council again formed an international tribunal, this time
to try 35 defendants accused of the genocide of Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda.62 The
first defendant convicted in this continuing trial was a Rwandan mayor, Jean-Peal
Akayesu.63 By Security Council mandate, both of these ad hoc tribunals dealt only
with crimes committed in those two areas during "specific periods of time." 64 As
such, the ad hoc tribunals have been specifically empowered to deal with specific
crimes during defined time periods, and are not provided the power to try all such
crimes occurring at any point in time.
In response to the large numbers of horrific war crimes occurring in the recent
past, 65 coupled with the understanding that there is no continuously-serving
international body specifically charged with the jurisdiction over individuals
committing such crimes, there has been a recent push to create an International
52. COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, Questions and Answers on the
International Criminal Court at 1, available at http://www.igc.org/icc/html/pressqandaicc.pdf (last
visited Feb. 18, 2002).
53. See International Court of Justice 1946-1996, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneral
information/ibbook/Bbookframepage.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2002).
54. See COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 52, at 1.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 2.
57. See Key Tribunals,supra note 46.
58. See id.
59. See Blaine Harden, The Family Milosevic: The Unrepentant,Jan. 20, 2002, availableat http://
www.nytimes.com/2002/01/20/magazine/20MILO.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2002).
60. See UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, supra note I1,
at art. 3.
61. See Helena Cobban, Milosevic on Trial: Big Test for the Hague Court, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jul. 9, 2001, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0709/pl3sl-coop.html (last
visited Mar. 30, 2002).
62. See Key Tribunals,supra note 46.
63. Id.
64. See COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 52, at 2.
65. See id. at I ("In the past 50 years alone, more than 250 conflicts have erupted around the
world; more than 86 million civilians, mostly women and children died in these conflicts; and over 170
million people were stripped of their rights, property and dignity.").
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Criminal Court. 66 The International Criminal Court [hereinafter the "ICC"] has just
recently passed the ratification process.67
The ICC is designed as "a permanent, independent institution capable of
addressing the crimes identified in [its founding document] on an ongoing
basis. .,,6 The ICC, however, is not designed to supplant domestic judicial
bodies. Rather "the Court can exercise its jurisdiction if national courts are
unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute such crimes." 69 The ICC is
specifically designed to hold individuals criminally responsible for acts of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and "aggression. '' 7° Due to an
71
inability to agree on a definition, terrorism was not included among that list.
Because the ICC has just passed the ratification process and its founding members
have failed as of yet to agree on a definition of terrorism, were the United Nations
to convene an international tribunal to address the terrorist acts of September 11 th,
it would likely be convened in one of two forms: either as an ad hoc tribunal under
a Security Council Resolution, or as an international trial under the ICC following
the creation of a working definition of terrorism.

66. The framework for the ICC, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [hereinafter
the "Rome Statute"], was created during the United Nations Diplomatic Conference held in Rome
during July, 1998, and adopted on July 17, 1998. 139 nations have signed the Rome Statute, including
the United States, which signed the Rome Statute on December 31, 2000. See COALITION FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 52, at 2.
67. According to its provisions, the Rome Statute will enter into force, thus creating the ICC, after
its 60th ratification. See id. at 2. On May 15, 2002, Greece became the 67th State to ratify the Rome
Statute. See Rome Statute Signature and Ratification Chart, at http://www.igc.org/icc/rome/
html/ratify.html (last visited May 15, 2002).
68. See COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 52, at 2.
69. Id.
70. The crimes are thus defined:
Genocide covers those specifically listed prohibited acts (e.g. killing, causing serious
harm) committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or
religious group.
Crimes against humanity cover those specifically listed prohibited acts when committed
as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population.
Such acts include murder, extermination, rape, sexual slavery, the enforced
disappearance of persons and the crime of apartheid, among others.
Genocide and crimes against humanity are punishable irrespective of whether they are
committed in time of "peace" or of war.
War crimes cover grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other serious
violations of the laws of war, committed on a large scale in international as well as
internal armed conflicts. The inclusion of internal conflicts is consistent with customary
international law and reflects the reality that in the past 50 years, the most serious
violations of human rights have occurred, not in international conflicts, but within States.
The crime of aggression will be dealt with by the Court when the Assembly of States
Parties has agreed on the definition, elements and conditions under which the Court will
exercise jurisdiction; this cannot happen until a review conference has been held, seven
years after entry into force of the treaty.
Id. at 3.
71. See id. at 4.
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III. U.S. MILITARY TRIBUNALS
A. A BriefHistory of US. Military Tribunal Usage
U.S. history is punctuated by several military tribunals.72 It is believed that the
first such use may have come as early as 1780, 73 when Major John Andre,
Adjutant-General to the British Army, was tried as a spy before a "Board of
General Officers" and was hung. 74 The first official U.S. military tribunals are
traced to 1847, during the U.S.-Mexican War, where General Winfield Scott
ordered that U.S. forces committing violations of the law of war be punished by
military tribunal.75 One notable occurrence is the 1865 military tribunal used to
sentence four individuals to death for the conspiracy resulting in the assassination
of President Abraham Lincoln .7 6
In 1942, in what is arguably the most famous military tribunal use, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered military tribunals to try eight German saboteurs
caught sneaking ashore in New York and Florida.77 In Ex parte Quirin, a habeas
corpus proceeding brought appurtenant to that case, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that military tribunals may be used to try "unlawful combatants., 7' The
significance of that determination is discussed below.
B. US. Military Tribunals as Applied in Ex ParteQuirin
"I want one thing clearly understood... I won't hand them over to any
UnitedStates Marshalarmed with a writ of habeas corpus.79
The story behind Ex parte Quirin is a wild tale of international intrigue.80
Each of the eight German-born saboteurs had spent time living and working in the
U.S. 8t Each returned to Germany between 1933 and 1941,82 under a plan which
offered any German citizen a free one-way ticket home.83 Each was subsequently
recruited and trained under Operation Pastorius, 84 and given the goal of targeting
85
both war-important sites and creating generalized terror in the U.S.

72. See, e.g. Key Tribunals, supranote 46.
73. See id.
74. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 n.9 (1942).
75. See, Key Tribunals, supra note 46.
76. See Lawrence L. Knutson, Response to Terror,L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at A9.
77. See Key Tribunals,supranote 46.
78. See infra text accompanying note 98.
79. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, as quoted in a memo to Attorney General Francis Biddle. See
Gary Cohen, The Keystone Kommandos, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 2002, at 53.
80. For an engaging account of the events, see id.
81. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 20 (1942).
82. See id.
83. See Cohen, supra note 79, at 47.
84. Operation Pastorius was named after Franz Daniel Pastorius, the leader of the first group of
Germans to land in Germantown, Pennsylvania. See Cohen, supra note 79, at 47.
85. The target sites included factories involved in the aluminum industry, hydro-electric plants,
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The eight saboteurs arrived by U-boat between June 13 and 17, 1942,6
landing in New York and Florida.87 The saboteurs, fortunately, never achieved
their destructive goals: within two weeks, the F.B.I. had captured them all. 8 8 On
July 2, 1942, President Roosevelt appointed a Military Commission, directing it to
try the saboteurs for violations of the Articles of War. 89 The same day, the
President declared that:
all persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with the
United States or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any such
nation, and who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United States...
through coastal or boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or
attempting or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or
violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the
jurisdiction of military tribunals; and that such persons shall not be privileged to
seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any
such remedy
or proceeding sought on their behalf, in the courts of the United
90
States.

The military tribunal began July 8, 1942, 91in room 5235 of the Department of
Justice.92 The eight saboteurs were tried before a tribunal of seven, which consisted
of four Major Generals and three Brigadier Generals. 93 The defense rested nineteen
days later. 94 Defense counsel then filed a writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme
Court, arguing that the President's order was "invalid and unconstitutional,96' 95 and
that civilian courts, not military courts, were the proper forum for this trial.
The Supreme Court, meeting in special session, denied those arguments,97
stating that:
an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the
purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, [is among several]
familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to
the status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders
against the law of war subject to
98
trial and punishment by military tribunals.
The Court continued, "[u]nlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture
and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military
waterways, railroads, bridges, and Jewish-owned department stores. See id. at 46.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 22.
See 7 C.F.R. § 5101 (1942), quoted in Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 22-23.
See Cohen, supra note 79, at 55.
See id.
See id. at 54.
See id. at 58.
See id. at 55.
See id.
See id. at 59.
See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31.
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tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful. "99
With the legality of the proceedings assured, President Roosevelt sentenced
six of the eight saboteurs to death by electrocution. I °° The sentence was carried out
the next day.' 0 ' The six were buried in a pauper's cemetery, in the District of
Columbia,l 2 their graves marked only with numbers 276 through 281.1°3 The other4
years, the other for lifeY
two saboteurs received prison sentences; one for thirty
10 5
Six years later, the two were deported to Germany.
C. PresidentBush's Military Tribunal'0 6 Plan
"From the territory of Afghanistan, the Al-Qaeda organization continues to
train and support agents of terror who attack innocent people throughout the
world and7 target United States nationals and interests in the United States and
10
abroad."'
"[Tiens of thousands of trained terrorists are still at large. These enemies
view the entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever they
are.11108
The power and authority underlying President Bush's ability to both issue his

Military Order, "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism,"' 10 9 and to convene military tribunals, stems initially from
his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and from
the powers thus vested by Articles 21 and 36 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice." 0 Additional authority comes from section 3 of the Manual for Courts-

99. Id.
100. See Cohen, supranote 79, at 59.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. This paper will refer to historical military tribunals, as well as the proceedings established
following the mandate included in President Bush's Military Order, as "military tribunals." See supra
note 4.
107. See Letter Dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2001/946 (2001), available at http://www.un.int/usa/s-2001-946.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
108. See President Delivers State of the Union Address, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/01/20020129-1 1.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
109. See Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, [hereinafter "Military Order"], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2001).
110. See U.S. CONST., art. 11,§ 2 ("The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States."); UCMJ, art. 21 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2001)) ("The provisions of
this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost
courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by
statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military
tribunals."); UCMJ, art. 36 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2001)) ("pretrial, trial, and post-trial
procedures, including modes of proof, for cases arising under [chapter 101, triable in courts-martial,
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Martial,"' and federal case law. 1 2 President Bush did not consult Congress when
drafting his Military Order. 1 3 However, Congress did authorize President Bush to
use military force against al Qaeda militants." 4
The President's Military Order states that due to the "magnitude of potential
deaths, injuries and property destruction"'" 5 that may result from terrorist attacks,
"and the probability that such attacks will occur.., an extraordinary emergency
exists for national defense purposes, that this emergency constitutes an urgent and
compelling interest, and that issuance of this order is necessary to meet the
emergency."" 16 In his Military Order, President Bush authorized the use of military
tribunals against international terrorists, stating that they are "to be detained, and,
when tried, to be tried' for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws
by military tribunals." 17
The scope of the Military Order's term "international terrorist" is wide: it
encompasses al Qaeda members, any individual who has "engaged in, aided or
abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism" or acts that have
threatened injury to United States "citizens, national security, foreign policy, or
economy," as well as any individual who has knowingly harbored an international
terrorist.' ' Under the later-adopted Patriot Act,' 9 the definition of engaging in
military commissions and other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry, may be
prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the
principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the
United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with [chapter 10]."). See
generally, Robert J.Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President's ConstitutionalAuthority to Conduct
OperationsAgainst Terrorist Organizationsand the Nations that Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 487 (2002); Robert F. Turner, The War on Terrorismand the Modern Relevance of
the CongressionalPower to "Declare War," 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 519 (2002). But see Diane F.
Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes To War: Prosecuting Terrorists Before
Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 653 (2002); George P. Fletcher, On Justice and
War: Contradictionsin the ProposedMilitary Tribunals,25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 635 (2002).
111. JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MIL. JUST., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES I-I at §
3 (2000) [hereinafter "Manual for Courts-Martial"] (stating that the agencies through which military
jurisdiction is exercised includes courts-martial), available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/
mcm2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2002).
112. See e.g., Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,28-29 (1942) ("An important incident to the conduct of
war is the adoption of measures by the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemy, but to
seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who... have violated the law of war.").
113. See Jess Bravin, Deputy to Ashcroft and Senators Clash on Tribunal Policy, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 29, 2001, at A4.
114. "[Tlhe President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks
that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons." See Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Those
Responsible for the Recent Attacks Against the United States § 2, Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat. 224

(2001).
115. Military Order, supra note 109, at § (1)(g).
116. Id.
117. Id. at§ (1)(e).
118. Military Order, supra note 109, at § (2)(a)(I)(iii). The Military Order does not provide for the
trial of U.S. citizens. See id. at § (2)(a). The Supreme Court, however, does not limit military tribunal
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"terrorist activity" includes any foreigner who uses "dangerous devices" or
knowingly or unknowingly raises money for any terrorist group. 12 While not
Military Order does allow for the
applicable to U.S. citizens, President Bush's
2
military trial of U.S. permanent residents.' '
In his Military Order, President Bush, for reasons of "danger to the safety of
the United States and the nature of international terrorism,"' 12 2 found it "not
practicable" to apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence as recognized
in criminal courts.12 3 According to Phillip Lacovara, former Deputy Solicitor
General, "[p]eople charged with violations of the laws of war are not entitled to the
charged with crimes, as long as the
same level of guarantees as civilians
24
proceedings are fundamentally fair."1

Accordingly, President Bush's military tribunals have their own rules of
procedure. These procedural rules markedly differ from "traditional" procedural
military tribunals
rules as applied in civilian courts. 125 Among these differences:
127
126
may be closed proceedings, even to the accused himself, there are no juries,
defendants are judged instead by a group consisting of between three and seven
members,12 8 where each member is a commissioned officer of the United States
military; 129 U.S. military tribunals may be held extraterritorially, e.g. in foreign

countries or upon U.S. naval ships; 130 defendants have no right to counsel while
being interrogated,13 ' and will not have the benefit of receiving exculpatory
evidence in possession of the prosecution, as they would if prosecuted in a non-

use to non-citizens: in Ex parte Milligan, the Court held that U.S. citizens may be tried by military
tribunals, but only if civilian courts are "actually closed." See Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 127 (1866).
See also Tribunals BreakSharply from Civilian Courts, supranote 10.
119. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 [hereinafter the "Patriot Act"], available at http://www.eff.org/
Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorismmilitias/20011025_hr3162 usapatriot bill.html (last visited Jan. 27,
2002).
120. See Matthew Purdy, Legal Powers Are Expanded in Bush Plan, N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERV.,
Nov. 26,2001.
121. See generally Military Order, supra note 109. See also supra note 118.
122. See Military Order, supra note 109, at § (1)(f).
123. Id. at § (1)(f).
124. See Purdy, supra note 120.
125. Compare The Avalon Project: Uniform Rules of Procedure,Military Tribunals, Nuernberg,
Revised to 8 January 1948, at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/Avalon.imt.rules5.htm (last visited Feb. 14,
2002), with Military Order, supra note 109, Dep't of Defense Fact Sheet, supra note 5, at 2-3, and
DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Military Commission Order No. 1 [hereinafter "Order No. I"], available at
http://www.defenselink.miVnews/Mar2002/d2002032 lord.pdf (last visited March 21, 2002).
126. See Tribunals Break Sharply from Civilian Courts, supra note 10; Order No. 1, supra note
125, at § 6(B)(3) (stating that the decision to close a proceeding or portion thereof may include a
decision to exclude the accused).
127. See Tribunals Break Sharplyfrom Civilian Courts, supra note 10.
128. See Order No. 1,supra note 125, at § 4(A)(2).
129. See id., at §4(A)(3).
130. See Tribunals Break Sharply from Civilian Courts, supra note 10; Order No. 1, supra note
125, at § 6(B)(4).
131. Serge Schmemann, Prisoners,Surely. But POWs?, N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERV., Jan. 27, 2002.
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tribunal setting; 32 and guilt need only "have probative value to a reasonable
person,"' 133 it need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, guilt may
be established by as little as a two-thirds vote of its judges. 134 Under Bush's
military tribunal plan, the sentences meted out may be severe, up to and including
life imprisonment or even death. 135 The Department of Defense's Military
Commission Order No. 1, which established the tribunals' actual procedural rules,
136
provides that a death sentence may be imposed only upon a unanimous verdict.
While Bush's original plan made no provision for terrorists to appeal the
tribunal's decision, 37 his released plan included the provision that guilty verdicts
may be appealed to the Secretary of Defense and to the President.' 3' There is,
however, no provision for appeal to any U.S. court. 13 9 The analysis underlying
support of this position is based on the fact that the detainees are being held
outside of the sovereign territory of the U.S., see Section IV(C), below. Habeas
corpus review is similarly stymied. Because the right to federal habeas corpus
review only applies if the trials are conducted on U.S. sovereign territory, 40 the
fact that most of the al Qaeda militants are imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
will effectively preclude federal review if the detainees are tried
extraterritorially. 14
Amnesty International has raised concerns over the procedure outlined in
Bush's Military Order. Among the concerns the organization raises are that the
Military Order is discriminatory, because it affords foreign nationals "a lower
standard of justice than U.S. nationals," that there is no separation between the
executive branch's role and that of the judiciary because it "gives unfettered and
unchallengeable discretionary power to the executive to decide whom will be
prosecuted and under what rules," that the Military Order "bypasses the normal
principles of law and rules of evidence in the trials of people charged with criminal

132. See Purdy, supranote 120.
133. See id.
134. See id. See also Military Order, supra note 109, at § (4)(a).
135. See Military Order, supra note 109, at § (4)(a). It is widely known that President Bush, former
governor of Texas, a state which has executed 257 prisoners since 1976, is a proponent of the death
penalty. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, Number of Executions By State Since 1976, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicreg.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2002); Bush Takes Case for Military
Tribunalsto Spain's PM, Dow JONES INT'L NEws, Nov. 28, 2001.
136. See Order No. 1, supra note 125, at § 6(F). For the corresponding rule applying to military
courts-martial, see Manual for Courts-Martial, supranote 111, at Rule 1006(d)(4)(A).
137. The Military Order states that "the individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or
maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the
individual's behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any
foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal." Military Order, supra note 109, at §7(b)(2). See also
Jess Bravin, Deputy to Ashcroft And Senators Clash On Tribunal Policy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2001, at
A4.
138. See id. See also Order No. 1, supra note 125, at § 6(-1)(5)-(6).
139. See Military Order, supra note 109, at §7(b)(2).
140. See generally Coalition of Clergy v. George Walker Bush, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 (C.D.
Cal. 2002).
141. See infra text accompanying notes 162-171.
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offenses in the U.S. courts," and that there was no right to appeal. 142 The
applicability of U.S. constitutional and international legal protections to the instant
situation are discussed below.
IV. THE APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS TO AL QAEDA MILITANTS

A. Why Aren't al Qaeda Militants ProtectedAs Prisonersof War Under the
Geneva Convention?
"If a US. Serviceman were captured by Talibanforces, we - and the US. would be fighting to ensure that he be entitled to protection as a prisoner of
war .... Capturedcombatants should
have this presumptionand any doubt should
143
be decidedby a competent tribunal."'
Historically, the U.S. viewed terrorists as "common criminals, to be tried in
civil courts."' 14 4 Now, the White House considers the captured al Qaeda members,

housed at Camp X-Ray, 145 neither common criminals nor prisoners of war, but
rather unlawful combatants. 146 According to Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of
Defense, "the detainees are not being labeled as prisoners of war because they did
not engage in warfare according to the precepts of the Geneva Convention-they
hide weapons, do not wear uniforms and try to blur the line between combatant
and noncombatant." 147
Making such a distinction materially affects the detainees' rights. Because
they are not prisoners of war, the detainees are not afforded the same procedural
and evidentiary rights that a prisoner of war receives. 148 Again turning to the words
of Secretary Rumsfeld, "[t]echnically, unlawful combatants do not have any rights
under the Geneva convention [sic]. We have indicated that we do plan to, for the
most part, treat them in a manner that is reasonably consistent with the Geneva
142. See AMNESTY INT'L, USA: PresidentialOrder on Military Tribunals Threatens Fundamental
Principles of Justice, available at http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/AMR511652001 (last visited
Feb. 18, 2002).
143. Darcy Christen, spokesperson for the Red Cross' Geneva headquarters, quoted in Chip
Cummins and Laurie P. Cohen, Legal Limbo of US. Afghan-War PrisonersTouches Off a Storm of
CriticismOverseas, WALL ST. J., Jan, 22, 2002, at A22.
144. Schmemann, supranote 131.
145. Camp X-Ray is the name given to the detention center recently built at the U.S. naval base in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Guantanamo Bay naval base is perhaps best known for its role during the
mid-1990s, when it was used to sequester "thousands of Cuban and Haitian refugees." See Cummins &
Cohen, supra note 143.
146. TribunalsBreak Sharplyfrom Civilian Courts, supra note 10.
147. See Jim Garamone, Mistreatment Allegations 'Just Plain False,' AM. FORCES PRESS SERV.,
Jan. 22, 2002, available at http://www.defenselink.miI/news/Jan2002/ n01222002_200201223.html
(last visited Jan. 25, 2002).
148. See Tim Collie, Tribunals Would Be Models For Future Terrorist Trials, S. FLA. SUN
SENTINEL, Jan. 12, 2002, at IA. See also Convention (No. III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisonersof
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter the "Geneva Convention"], available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2002).
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conventions to the extent they are appropriate."' 149 Under that extraordinarily
ambiguous statement, Secretary Rumsfeld apparently, while nodding to the
Geneva Convention, has apparently left wide open the possibility of radical
departures 50from conventional protections afforded prisoners of war facing military
tribunals.1
Secretary Rumsfeld's argument that al Qaeda members are not prisoners of
war is supported by the text of the Geneva Convention. Certainly, a prisoner of war
must necessarily come from a military group.' 5' Under the Geneva Convention, the
armed forces of a signatory State are automatically protected. 152 However, when
captured prisoners hale from "other militias" or "other volunteer corps," they must
meet several criteria to qualify for protection. 53 Among the criteria is the
requirement that they report to a commanding authority, have a recognized military
insignia, openly carry their arms, and conduct their operations "in accordance with
the laws and customs of war."'' 54 According to Ruth Wedgewood, a former federal
prosecutor and current professor of law and international diplomacy at Johns
Hopkins University, al Qaeda does not meet that criteria.' 55 "AI-Qaida defines
itself as a group solely to make jihad, to make war and to use terrorism to do it. It
doesn't have a recognizable charitable function like Hamas or Hezbollah, it doesn't
have recognizable insignias."' i 56 On that basis, the Geneva Convention affords no
protection to the detainees. The next section examines what protection the U.S.
Constitution may afford.
B. Are Al Qaeda Militants Protectedby the US. Constitution?
While the Supreme Court has developed a "rich, complex, and seemingly
incoherent jurisprudence of the non-citizen," 157 resulting in at least five different
standards of review, 58 a general policy has emerged: outside of the immigration

149. See Collie, supra note 148.
150. All rights, however, have not been lost. Under the Military Order, a] Qaeda militants housed at
Camp X-Ray are to be provided with humane treatment, adequate food, water, shelter, clothing, medical
treatment, and are allowed the free exercise of religion. See Military Order, supra note 109, at § (3)(b)(d).
151. See Geneva Convention, supra note 148, at art. 4, § 1.
152. Id.
153. See id. atart.4, § 2.
154. See id. at art. 4, § 2(a)-(d). See also Michael C. Dorf, Findlaw Forum: What is an 'Unlawful'
Combatant, and Why Does it Matter?, available at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/01/columns/
fl.dorf.combatants.01.23/index.htm (last visited Jan 27, 2002). The Geneva Convention's criteria
extends at least as far back as 1899. See Convention With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Jul. 29, 1899, Annex, art. 1, 32 Stat. 1803, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalonl
lawofWar/hague02.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2002).
155. See Collie, supra note 148.
156. Id.
157. Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81
IOWA L. REV. 707, 711 (1996).

158. The standards of review range from strict scrutiny, based on a determination that aliens are a
"discrete and insular minority," see, e.g. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) ("[A]liens as
a class are a prime example of a discrete and insular minority for whom such heightened judicial
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context, non-citizens residing in the U.S. are protected by the Constitution., 59 For
the most part, the detainees are non-citizens. Therefore, the question of whether
constitutional protections extend to al Qaeda detainees must necessarily be decided
upon whether Guantanamo Bay, Cuba's Camp X-Ray is within the U.S.' sovereign
territory. 160 Such analysis has legal precedent: in 1950, the Supreme Court held
that German nationals captured in China at the end of World War II had no right to
nationals were seized
file habeas corpus petitions in any U.S. court, because the
6
and held at all times outside the U.S.' sovereign territory.1 1
In the instant case, the U.S. government argues that no federal court has
authority over al Qaeda militants being held at Camp X-Ray. 62 In a recent brief
filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, 163 government
lawyers argued that Camp X-Ray is not sovereign territory because Cuba retained
sovereignty when it leased the base to the U.S. in 1903.' 64 The Cuban government
solicitude is appropriate"), to nonjusticiability, which considers this issue to fall under the political
questions doctrine, such that aliens' status should be determined by the legislative, not the judicial
branch. See Scaperlanda, supra note 157, at 711. These two poles represent the two broad categories
into which the five standards fall: "one marked by extreme deference to the political branches of
government, and the other, in stark contrast, marked by heightened suspicion of invidious governmental
action." Id. at 712.
159. See e.g. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 754 (1893) ("Aliens from countries at
peace with us, domiciled within our country by its consent, are entitled to all the guaranties for the
protection of their persons and property which are secured to native-born citizens. ...Arbitrary and
despotic power can no more be exercised over them with reference to their persons and property, than
over the persons and property of native-born citizens. They differ only from citizens in that they cannot
vote or hold any public office. As men having our common humanity, they are protected by all the
guaranties of the Constitution."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886) ("The rights of
The
petitioners.. are not less because they are aliens and subjects of the Emperor of China ....
[Its]
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens ....
provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality ....); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-80
(1976) ("The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause
does not lead to the further conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of
citizenship or, indeed, to the conclusion that all aliens must be placed in a single homogeneous legal
classification. For a host of constitutional and statutory provisions rest on the premise that a legitimate
distinction between citizens and aliens may justify attributes and benefits for one class not accorded to
the other.... In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.").
160. See e.g. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 260 (1990) (holding that "those
cases in which aliens have been determined to enjoy certain constitutional rights establish only that
aliens receive such protections when they have come within the territory of, and have developed
substantial connections with, this country.").
161. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950) ("We have pointed out that the privilege
of litigation has been extended to aliens, whether friendly or enemy, only because permitting their
presence in the country implied protection. No such basis can be invoked here, for these prisoners at no
relevant time were within any territory over which the United States is sovereign, and the scenes of
their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of
any court of the United States.").
162. See David Rosenzweig, Response to Terror: U.S. Asks Judge to Reject Claim Over Detainee
Prisoners,L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2002, at A5.
163. See id.
164. See id.

2002

PROSECUTING AL QAEDA

agrees with that assessment. In a statement deriding the U.S.' use of Guantanamo
Bay for detention facilities, Cuba states that "[t]he American Naval Base at
Guantanamo is a facility located in an area of 117.6 square kilometers of the
national territory of Cuba .... 16 5 In Coalition of Clergy v. George Walker Bush,
the United States District Court for the Central District of California agrees with
both Cuba's and the U.S. government's assertion: Camp X-Ray is not within U.S.
sovereign territory.'66
The federal district court's conclusion stems from the language of the lease
agreement itself. 167 According to the Lease Agreement:
While on the one hand the United States recognizes the continuance of the
ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the above described areas of
land and water, on the other hand the Republic of Cuba consents that during the
period of occupation by the United States of said areas under the terms of this

shall exercise complete jurisdiction and control over
agreement the United States
68
and within said areas.1

Coalition of Clergy is dispositive on this issue, stating that the Lease
Agreement's assignation of "jurisdiction and control" to the U.S. does not arise to
"sovereignty," because the lease itself distinguished between the two.' 69 At least
two other federal court cases have dealt with this issue, and agree with this
determination.1 70 Therefore, while the U.S. retains jurisdiction and control over the
immediate area, Cuba retains sovereignty, as established by international treaty,
and judicially recognized by U.S. courts. Accordingly, because the detainees are
not held in U.S. sovereign territory, constitutional protections are not afforded
them.

171

The determination that Camp X-Ray does not lie within U.S. territory
broaches another question, whether any U.S. court has jurisdiction over the

165. See Declaraci6n del Gobiemo de laRepfiblica de Cuba a laOpini6n Ptblica Nacional e
Internacional, II de enero del 2002 [Statement by the Government of Cuba to the National and
International Public Opinion January 11, 2002], available at http://www.cuba.cu/gobiemo/documentos/
2002/ing/dII0102i.html (last visited Apr. 5,2002).
166. See Coalition of Clergy v. George Walker Bush, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *41 (C.D.
Cal. 2002).
167. See Lease to the United States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 23,
1903, U.S.-Cuba, T.S. No. 418 [hereinafter the "Lease Agreement"], as modified by Treaty Between
the United States of America and Cuba Defining their Relations, May 29, 1934, art. 111, 48 Stat 1682,
1683.
168. Lease Agreement, supra note 167, at art. III.
169. See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748, at *38 ("The agreement explicitly
distinguishes the two in providing that Cuba retains 'sovereignty' whereas 'jurisdiction and control' are
exercised by the United States.").
170. See Cuban American Bar Assoc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1425 (1 IthCir. 1995) ("[T]he
district court erred in concluding that Guantanamo Bay was a 'United States territory.' We disagree that
control and jurisdiction is equivalent to sovereignty."); Bird v. Unites States, 923 F.Supp. 338, 342-43
(D. Conn. 1996) (holding that sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay remained with Cuba).
171. This does not address the possibility of extending jurisdiction over the detainees' captors, as
detailed below. See infra section IV(C).
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detainees. Coalition of Clergy v. George Walker Bush addresses that issue when
analyzing whether al Qaeda militants are being illegally detained in Guantanamo
Bay.
C. The Applicability of the Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum: Coalitionof
Clergy v. George Walker Bush
Under our law, the alien in several respects stands on an equal footing with
citizens, but in others has never been conceded legal parity with the citizen.., he
may invoke the writ of habeas corpus to protect his personal liberty; in criminal
proceedings against him, he must be accorded the protections of the Fifth and
172
Sixth Amendments ....
We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other country where the
writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant time
and in no stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction. Nothing
in the text
of the Constitution extends such a right, nor does anything in our
1 73
statutes.
The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, Latin for "you should have the
body to submit to,' ' 1 74 has been applied for and ordered for nearly eight hundred
years. 75 The writ is issued in order to bring a party before the court, "to test the
legality of the detention or imprisonment."'' 76 Use of the writ is protected under the
U.S. Constitution, which states the "privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it.' 1 77 Federal judges are empowered to issue writs of habeas
corpus.178

On January 20, 2002, a group ofjournalists, lawyers, and clergy filed a writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California. Their petition, Coalition of Clergy v. George Walker Bush, alleges that
the detainees are being held "against their will and in violation of the United States
Constitution and the Geneva Convention."' 7 9 The petition seeks the "identification
of the persons involuntarily detained, that each of them be brought physically
before the court for a determination of their statuses"' 80 and the prevention of any
172. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 US 580, 586 & n.9 (1952).
173. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950).
174. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 284 (Pocket Ed. 1996).
175. In 1220, the words habeas corpora appeared on an "order directing an English sheriff to
produce parties to a trespass action before the Court of Common pleas." See Coalition of Clergy v.
George Walker Bush, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
176. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 709 (6h Ed. 1990).
177. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9.
178. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2001).
179. See Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, Coalition of Clergy v. George Walker
Bush, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (No. CV 02-570 AHM), available at
http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
180. Id. at 5.
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transfer of the detainees from Camp X-Ray.'8 In response, the District Court
issued a show cause order, and, expressing "strong doubts that it has
jurisdiction,"'18 2 ordered written briefs addressing several8 3 questions centering on
1
both the petitioners' standing and the court's jurisdiction.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus "shall be in writing signed and
verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his
behalf." ' 4 Under the Whitmore-Massie "next friend" test,185 a third party has
standing to ask a court to issue a writ of habeas corpus, provided that: "(1)... the
petitioner is unable to litigate his own cause due to mental incapacity, lack of
access to court, or other similar disability; and (2) the next friend has some
significant relationship with, and is truly dedicated to the best interests of,
petitioner."'18 6 Quite simply, the Whitmore-Massie test was inapplicable because
the petitioners had no next-friend standing. According to the District Court, the
petitioners lacked a significant relationship, "indeed, any relationship,"' I8 7 with the
detainees. 188 That lack of standing thus precluded the instant court from hearing the
case. 8 9 The granting of a writ of habeas corpus is controlled by 28 U.S.C. §
2241.190 Under Section 2241, a writ of habeas corpus "may be granted by the
Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within
their respective jurisdictions."19'
In Carbo v. United States, the Supreme Court discussed the meaning of the
phrase "within their respective jurisdictions." According to the Supreme Court,
the phrase... acts as an obvious limitation upon the action of individual judges'
because it reflects the conclusion of Congress that it would be "inconvenient,
potentially embarrassing, certainly expensive and on the whole quite unnecessary
to provide every judge anywhere with the authority to issue the [writ)
192 on behalf of
applicants far distantly removed from the courts whereon they sat."'
The court may, however, retain jurisdiction when the "custodian of the
petitioner" is within the district. 93 While 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) provides for

181. See id. at 9.

182. See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *4.
183. See 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 907 at * 1 ("RESPONDENTS ARE HEREBY ORDERED TO
SHOW CAUSE WHY they should not be subject to the jurisdiction of this Court in a habeas corpus
persons allegedly held by them at the U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.").
184. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2001).
185. See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *12. See also Massie v. Woodford,
244 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2001).
186. Massie, 244 F.3d at 1194.

187. See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *22.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
362 U.S.
193.

See id.
See id. at *23.
See 28 U.S.C.S. § 2241 (2001).
See id. at § 2241(a).
See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *25, quoting Carbo v. United States,
611,617 (1961).
See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *25.
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nationwide service of process on "officers or employees of the United States,"' 94
the Ninth Circuit holds that this "does not extend habeas corpus jurisdiction to
persons outside the territorial limits of the district court."' 95 Incorporating the
discussion above, 196 the District Court determined that there was "no showing or
allegation that any named respondent is within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Central District of California."' 197 Thus, the District Court concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction, and denied issuing a writ of habeas corpus.9s
While the District Court noted that it lacked jurisdiction over the detainees or
their custodians, that determination does not directly dispose of the case. The
District Court noted that a means of continuing the action is to transfer the case to
another court, one having jurisdiction over the detainees' custodian or anyone else
in the "chain of command."' 199 In order to transfer the instant case to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, three conditions must be met: "(1) the
transferring court lacks jurisdiction; (2) the transferee court could have exercised
jurisdiction at the time the action was filed; and (3) the transfer is in the interest of
justice.' 20 0 According to federal law as applied in the Ninth Circuit, if another
federal court can exercise jurisdiction, then the law "mandates not dismissal, but
transfer to that court.",20' The analysis here focuses upon that requirement.
The Supreme Court supports the transferring of cases between district courts
when jurisdiction over another "in the chain of command" can be established in the
new court. 202 For example, in Ex parte Hayes, a U.S. Army private stationed in
Germany sought habeas corpus relief, asserting that the Army failed to fulfill his
enlistment commitment and thus his "continued retention by the Army [was] ... in
violation of law and army regulations. 2 3 The Supreme Court noted that while
"the applicant's commanding officer is in Germany, outside the territorial limits of
any district court .... others in the chain of command... are in the District of
Columbia. ' , 20 4 As such, the Supreme Court determined that the Army was subject
to the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia, to where the case was then
transferred.2 °5
In Coalition of Clergy, the District Court for the Central District of California
determined that no jurisdiction could be transferred, because no jurisdiction could
194. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (2001).
195. See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *25.
196. See supra section IV(B).
197. See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *26.
198. See id.
199. Exparte Hayes, 414 U.S. 1327, 1328 (1973).
200. Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 907 at *28, quoting Cruz-Aguilera v. INS, 245
F.3d 1070, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2001).
201. See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *27; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2001)
("Whenever a civil action is filed in a court.., and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction,
the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action. . . to any other such court in which
the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed .....
202. Exparte Hayes, 414 U.S. at 1328.
203. Exparte Hayes, supra note 202, at 1327.
204. See id. at 1328.
205. See id. at 1329.
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be established in that court. As determined above, the petitioners lacked nextfriend status.20 6 Additionally, because the detainees are being held outside the
sovereign territory of the U.S., no transfer could be executed because no District
Court does, or could, have jurisdiction over the detainees. 2°7 The District Court
based that determination on the Supreme Court's holding in Johnson v.
Eisentrager. 208
In Eisentrager, the U.S. Army captured twenty-one German nationals in
China after Germany's surrender to the Allied forces. 20 9 The prisoners were
accused of spying for Japan by providing intelligence on American troop
movements. 2 They were tried and convicted by a military commission created by
the U.S. Commanding General in Nanking, China.21' In that case, the authority for
convening the Military Commission came from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
acting through the Commanding General of the U.S. Forces, China Theatre. 2 12 The
military commission was convened in China, under the express consent of the
Chinese government,213 yet involved no international participants.21 4 The prisoners
were convicted, their sentences were reviewed by 21military
authorities, and they
5
were repatriated to Germany for service of sentence.
Subsequent to that decision, an appeal was brought in federal district court. In
circumstances similar to the Coalition of Clergy case, the direct custodians of the
prisoners could not be served due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court agreed that while the "prisoners are in immediate physical custody of an
officer or officers not parties to the proceeding, respondents named in the petition
have lawful authority to effect that release. 2 16 The case proceeded against the
Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Army, and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S.2 17 Among the allegations were complaints that the
conviction and imprisonment violated "the Geneva Convention's provisions
governing the treatment of prisoners of war." 218 The District Court issued a rule to
show cause, and dismissed the case for lack ofjurisdiction.2 19
The District Court's ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, which concluded that "any person deprived of his liberty anywhere under
any purported authority of the United States is entitled to the writ if he can show
that extension to his case of any constitutional rights or limitations would show his

206. See supra text accompanying note 187.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *27.
See id. at *29.
See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765-66 (1950).
See id. at 766.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 766-67.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, supra note 209, at 767.

218. Id.

219. See id.
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imprisonment illegal., 220 That statutory jurisdiction must be held "as part of the
judicial power of the United States," 221 and "where deprivation of liberty by an
official act occurs outside the territorial jurisdiction of any District Court, the
petition will lie in the District Court which has territorial jurisdiction over officials
who have directive power over the immediate jailer., 222 Thus, under the Court of
Appeals analysis, an extraterritorial violation is indistinguishable from a territorial
violation, provided that jurisdiction can be established over anyone in the chain of
command.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals argument that "[the
answers stem directly from fundamentals [and] cannot be found by causal
reference to statutes or cases., 223 Instead, the Supreme Court, while acknowledging
that no statute directly addressed the issues, held that the answer does not stem
from abstract fundamentals, rather, it comes from the Constitution
itself. Indeed,
224
"[n]othing in the text of the Constitution extends such a right.,
Discussing what rights the Constitution does afford, the Supreme Court
reasoned that the Constitution does not abolish distinctions between resident
enemy aliens and nonresident enemy aliens.225 That is, there appears to be a sliding
scale of protections afforded aliens, such protections enlarging as the alien
"increases his identity with our society., 22 6 According to the Supreme Court,
"[m]ere lawful presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe
conduct and gives [the alien] certain rights; they become more extensive and
secure when he makes [a] preliminary declaration of intention to become a citizen,
and they expand to those of full citizenship upon naturalization. 227
These constitutional protections, however, do not extend to aliens outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. 228 The Supreme Court noted that the founding
fathers were the authors of the Bill of Rights, they wrote three Acts 229 which, by
denying enemy aliens "the constitutional immunities of citizens, it seems not then
to have been supposed that a nation's obligations to its foes could ever be put on a
parity with those to its defenders. 230 Continuing that historical analysis, the
220. Id. (emphasis added).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 768.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. Id. at 770.
227. Id.
228. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, supra note 209, at 770. See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 369 (1886) (holding that the Fourth Amendment's provisions are universal in their application, to
all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States).
229. See An Act concerning Aliens, Jun. 25, 1798, 1 Stat. 570; An Act respecting Alien Enemies,
Jul. 6, 1798, 1 Stat. 577; and An Act in addition to the act, entitled "An act for the punishment of
certain crimes against the United States," Jul. 14, 1798, 1 Stat. 596.
230. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 775. Founding father James Madison drew a distinction between
enemy and non-enemy aliens: "With respect to alien enemies, no doubt has been intimated as to the
federal authority over them; the Constitution having expressly delegated to Congress the power to
declare war against any nation, and of course to treat it and all its members as enemies." See id. at 775
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Supreme Court noted that the executive branch's power over enemy aliens,
"undelayed and unhampered by litigation, has been deemed throughout our history,
[to be] essential to war-time security."'231 In Eisentrager, the Supreme Court
determined that the prisoners were enemy aliens, had neither been to nor resided in
the U.S., were both captured and held outside U.S. territory, were tried and
convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the U.S. for violations of the
laws of war committed outside the U.S., and were imprisoned outside the U.S. at
all times.2 2 The Supreme Court thus overturned the Court of Appeals' holding
which had found jurisdiction.233 Instead, the Supreme Court denied the writ of
habeas corpus, in a holding which stated:
We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other country where the
writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant time
and in no stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction. Nothing
of the Constitution extends such a right, nor does anything in our
in the text
234
statutes.
In Coalition of Clergy, the District Court determined that the Eisentrager
holding was controlling. The District Court concluded that no court, including the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, could have jurisdiction
over the detainees because:
[tlhey are aliens; they were enemy combatants; they were captured in combat;
they were abroad when captured; they are abroad now; since their capture, they
have been under the control of only the military; they have not stepped foot on
entitling them to
American soil; and there are no legal or judicial precedents
235
pursue a writ of habeas corpus in an American civil court.
The District Court therefore dismissed the suit with prejudice.236
The above analysis establishes that according to U.S. law, the detention and
military trial of the al Qaeda detainees is proper. However, while "proper,"
America's foreign policy interests may still be best served by trying al Qaeda
internationally. The next section analyzes that argument.
V. THE ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING AND DISFAVORING PROSECUTING AL QAEDA
UNDER INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS

The spectrum of arguments supporting and disfavoring prosecuting al Qaeda
under international tribunals fall into three broad categories: the desire for
retribution, security concerns, and fairness and human rights issues. The arguments

n.6, quoting Madison's Report, 4 Elliot's Deb. 546, 554 (1800).
231. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 774.
232. See id. at 777.
233. See id. at 790.
234. Coalition of Clergy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2748 at *31.
235. See id. at *34.
236. See Coalition of Clergy, supra note 234, at *41.
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for international prosecution tend to fall under the latter category, while the
arguments for domestic military tribunals generally fall under the first two.
A. The Arguments Supportingthe Prosecutionof al Qaeda Under International
Tribunals
1.

The International Community has Provided Only Qualified Support of
U.S. Actions

Foreign nations were quick to support the U.S.'s initial anti-terrorism
response following the events of September 1 th. According to a U.S. State
Department report, 136 countries offered military support, 46 multilateral
organizations "declared their support," and 142 countries worked with the U.S. by
freezing financial assets.237 Saudi Arabia and the Middle Eastern states were
"supportive" and "ready to cooperate., 23' This foreign cooperation, however, did
not extend to the unequivocal support for using military tribunals to prosecute al
Qaeda members. That hesitancy may be explained by Article 2 of the European
Convention of Human Rights.
Under the European Convention of Human Rights, no European country may
extradite to a country where the death penalty will be used.23 9 Accordingly, the 43nation Council of Europe "urged European governments to ensure the death
penalty would not be sought before permitting any suspects to be extradited to the
United States., 240 Apparently acceding to that request, Spain refused to extradite
suspected al Qaeda members to the U.S. unless assurances would be made that
their cases would be tried in civilian courts, 241 or ina setting where the death
penalty would not be used.242 As succinctly stated by Luis Jordana, an international
criminal lawyer, "harsher measures can end up being counterproductive. 243
Were the tribunals conducted as an ad hoc tribunal of the type created by the
United Nations Security Council in the 1990s, prosecuting the detainees in such a
237. See COALITION INFO. CENTERS, The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days, available
at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/6947.htn (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
238. Id.
239. Under Article 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, "1. Everyone
has the right to life. 2. No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed." See COUNCIL OF
THE EU, Charterof FundamentalRights of the European Union, art. 2, Doc. No. 1023 (2001), available
at http://ue.eu.int/df/docs/en/EN_2001_1023.pdf. (last visited Jan. 23, 2002). See also Keith Johnson &
Carlta Vitzthum, EuropeansMake Case Against Use of Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2001,
at A12.
240. See AP, InternationalConcern Over US DetaineesAt GuantanamoBay, WASH. POST, Jan. 24,
2002, at AI7.
241. See Matthew Purdy, Legal Powers Are Expanded in Bush Plan, N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERV.,
Nov. 26,2001.
242. See Bush to Seek Spain's Backingfor Holding Military Tribunals, DESERET NEWS, Nov. 26,
2001, at A8.
243. Luis Jordana is a lawyer for Barcelona-based Cuatrecasas. See Keith Johaon and Carlta
Vitzthum, Europeans Make Case Against Use of Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2001, at
A12.
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forum may eliminate that hesitation and concern. Due to the particular constraints
imposed upon tribunals formed by the United Nations Security Council, the death
penalty would be unavailable. 244 Because at least some al Qaeda militants have
been detained in foreign countries, eliminating that bar to extradition may thus
mean that more al Qaeda militants are prosecuted and held accountable for their
crimes. However, such prosecution would necessarily fall under a non-capital
sentencing scheme.
2.

The U.S.' Steps Towards Investigating Suspected al Qaeda Have Caused
a Weakening of Traditional Constitutional Protections

"Amnesty Internationalbelieves that the Military Order threatens to severely
undermine, rather than reinforce, confidence in the administration ofjustice and
maintenance of the rule of law. The organization considers that in proceedings
undertaken
pursuant to this order, justice will neither be done, nor seen to be
24 5
done."
"[Ihfthe president can suspend246
one constitutionalprinciple today, the danger
is he can suspend others tomorrow."
While the al Qaeda detainees are not afforded the protections of the U.S.
Constitution, the weakening of traditional constitutional rights is a subject of much
concern. According to Nadine Strossen, president of the American Civil Liberties
Union, President Bush "bypasses Congress and the people by issuing executive
orders that essentially violate separation of powers and the checks and balances
system we have in this country., 247 This weakening of traditional constitutional
privileges and protections has taken on many forms.
In a Justice Department memo penned during the late fall of 2001, the
Honorable Judge Michael J. Creppy, the U.S.' chief immigration judge, imposed a
rule requiring that immigration hearings be conducted in secret. 248 Under that rule,
immigration courts were required "to close the hearings to the public, and to avoid
discussing the case or otherwise disclosing any information about the case. 249
While ostensibly made to protect the security of the involved parties, both
prosecution and defense, such proceedings have typically been open. While it may
be simplistic to state that procedural openness promotes constitutionality, the
closed nature of the proceedings eliminates one of the normally-present factors
enforcing the propriety of the system; that is, public observance of the judicial
process.
244. See supra text accompanying note 61.
245. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 142.
246. Timothy Lynch, Director of the criminal justice project of the Cato Institute, quoted in
William Glaberson, Liberal and Conservative Groups to Challenge Bush on Expansion of Powers, N.Y.
TIMES NEWS SERV., Nov. 30, 2001.
247. Karen E. Crummy, War takes toll on liberty - Feds wielding 'extraordinary'powers,BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 25, 2001.

248. See William Glaberson, Groups Criticize Recent Order on Secret Court Hearings for
Immigrants,N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERV., Dec. 7, 2001.
249. Id.
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Several other positions taken at both the federal and local level may impinge
the constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. The federal
government has decided to conduct interviews of 5,000 Middle Eastern men who
have entered the U.S. during the last two years.250 In New York City, police
searched their records for old petty crime warrants issued to those having Middle
Eastern-sounding names. 25' Over 100 people were found and interviewed, "with
the warrants used to encourage full cooperation. 252 Investigators have even
searched records on over 200 college campuses, seeking information on Middle
Eastern students, their studies, and their addresses. 253 Investigators made
unannounced visits "asking about anything from their views on Osama bin Laden
to their educational plans. '254 While the first group may have reason to be stopped
because warrants exist, and while the questions posed to the second group may fall
under "investigatory stop" procedures, 255 the pretextural reasons underlying the
stops should cause one to pause and consider the propriety of such actions. While
clear and convincing reasons may exist for such intrusion in the instant case,
caution should be exercised when large-scale detention and questioning stems from
hunches based upon simplistic connections like the sound of ones' name.
Several Bush Administration moves have signaled further reductions in
privileges afforded both the al Qaeda detainees and other terrorist defendants.
According to Marine Brigadier General Mike Lenhert, head of the task force in
charge of the detention facility, the detainees have been prevented from having
lawyers present during the interrogations taking place at Camp X-Ray.256
Additionally, even if counsel were afforded, a recent decision by the U.S. Justice
Department permits the listening in on conversations between lawyers and jailed
defendants. 257 This "special administrative measure" 258 "permits the monitoring of
attorney-client communications for these detainees only if the Attorney
General ...makes the additional finding that reasonable suspicion exists to believe
that a particular detainee may use communications with attorneys to further or
facilitate acts of terrorism. 259 Safeguards, however, have been provided. Among
250. See Purdy, supra note 120.
251. See id.
252. Id.
253. See id.
254. Id.
255. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 n.16 (1968) (holding that not all personal
intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons; only when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen has a
,seizure' occurred).
256. See Tony Winton, Guards at Guantanamo Say Apparent Command Structure GrowingAmong
Prisoners,AP, Jan. 27, 2002, availableat http://dailynewslosangeles.com/socal/terrorist/0l 02/27/terror
09.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2002).
257. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2001). See also David E. Sanger, Bush Defends Secret Tribunals in
Terrorist Cases,N.Y. TIMES NEWS SERV., Nov. 30, 2001; Jess Bravin, Deputy to Ashcroft and Senators
Clashon TribunalPolicy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2001, at A4.
258. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(a).
259. Dinh, infra note 301, at 404. See also 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) ("In any case where the Attorney
General specifically so orders, based on information from the head of a federal law enforcement or
intelligence agency that reasonable suspicion exists to believe that a particular inmate may use
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the requirements: there must be written advanced notice that communication will
be monitored; there can be no access between the monitoring team and any
prosecution effort; absent "imminent violence or terrorism," a court order is
required; and no privileged information will be retained.260 While this decision was
ostensibly made to "prevent prisoners from directing terrorist operations from
prison by using their lawyers to convey instructions to at-large confederates, 26'
the destruction of the attorney-client privilege is a serious violation of the legal
right to counsel, and as such should not be disposed of lightly. Additionally, were
counsel afforded the al Qaeda detainees, the extraterritorial nature of their
detention provides no surety that any U.S. law applies to them. In that case, there
may be no bar to listening in on attorney-client communications.
While this weakening of traditional constitutional privileges and protections
has taken on many forms, they have but a single overriding effect. The Bush
Administration is providing little room for captured al Qaeda militants to mount a
defense: procedurally, their rights are stymied; their access to counsel befuddled,
and their right to privileged communication with counsel eviscerated.
3.

Prosecuting the Detainees Internationally Preserves the U.S.' Human
Rights Stance

The worldwide promotion of human rights is in keeping with America's most
deeply held values. It is also strongly in our interests. Freedom fights terrorism,
instability and conflict. Time and again, experience has shown that countries which
demonstrate high degrees of respect for human rights also are the most secure and
the most successful. Indeed, respect for human rights is essential to lasting peace
and sustained economic growth, goals which Americans share with people all over
the world.262
Over the last few months, I have heard the worry that the war on terrorism
will sideline America's interest in human rights. This is far from true. In fact, the
protection of human rights is even more important now than ever. The U.S.
Government is deeply committed to the promotion of universal human rights and
the development of pluralistic, accountable governments.263
communications with attorneys or their agents to further or facilitate acts of terrorism, the Director,
Bureau of Prisons, shall, in addition to the special administrative measures imposed under paragraph (a)
of this section, provide appropriate procedures for the monitoring or review of communications
between that inmate and attorneys or attorneys' agents who are traditionally covered by the attorneyclient privilege, for the purpose of deterring future acts that could result in death or serious bodily injury
to persons, or substantial damage to property that would entail the risk of death or serious bodily injury
to persons.").
260. Dinh, infra note 301, at 404-05.
261. See Jess Bravin, Deputy to Ashcroft and Senators Clash on Tribunal Policy, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 29, 2001, at A4.
262. U.S. Sec'y of State Colin Powell, Remarks to the Press (Mar. 4, 2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/8635.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2002).
263. Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Lome Craner, Remarks
to the Press (Mar. 4, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/8635.htm (last visited
Mar. 4, 2002).
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One benefit of trying terrorists in international military tribunals is the
preservation of the U.S.' ability to censure other nations for human-rights abuses;
as William Safire puts it, the preservation of the "moral high ground." 264 This
position will likely become untenable if military tribunals are used to violate basic
human and legal rights. Understandably, the importance of this argument depends
upon one's view of the need to protect human rights on the international scene,
whether the U.S. has any ability to truly influence international human rights, and
whether such interest outweighs the natural desire for retribution in the wake of the
events of September 11 th. The view here is that it does.
For many years, the U.S. State Department has held that moral high ground
by fighting against foreign nations' use of military tribunals and secret courts.265 In
the 2000 edition of its annual human rights report, the State Department criticized
several foreign countries for using the very type of tribunals proposed by President
Bush. 2 In that report, the State Department criticized Egypt's use of military
courts to try terrorist defendants, stating that the military courts have "deprived
hundreds of civilian defendants of their constitutional right to be tried by a civilian
judge. 267 The report also criticized the military courts' lack of independence:
the military courts do not ensure civilian defendants due process before an
independent tribunal. While military judges are lawyers, they are also military
officers appointed by the Minister of Defense and subject to military discipline.
They are neither as independent
nor as qualified as civilian judges in applying the
26 8
civilian Penal Code.
The State Department's criticism is at least partially applicable to President
Bush's military tribunals, as here there is no provision for civilian judges, and no
judicial independence from the military. As its detractors have pointed out, "it is
hard to see how the State Department will be able to preserve this language
[critical of other
nations' use of such tribunals] without opening itself to a charge
26 9
of hypocrisy.

Several foreign nations have voiced concerns over the treatment of the
detainees. Malaysia has publicly voiced that they consider the treatment of the al
Qaeda members at Camp X-Ray to be "inhumane. 270 Germany has "expressed
human rights concerns and said Washington was jeopardizing support for the war
on terrorism. 27' In Great Britain, protests in Parliament and the press have led the
British Prime Minister Tony Blair to state that his government "would prefer to
264. See Satire, supra note 2.
265. See Neil King Jr., Bush's Plan to Use Tribunal Will Hurt US. in Human-Rights Arena, Some
Say, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2001.
266. See id.
267. U.S. STATE DEP'T, Egypt: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2000, available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/nea/784.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2002).
268. Egypt: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices2000, supra note 267.
269. See King, supra note 265, quoting Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch.
270. See AP, InternationalConcern Over US DetaineesAt Guantanamo Bay, DOW JONES ASIAN
EQUITIES REPORT, Jan. 24, 2002.
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have [the] three British detainees returned home to stand trial." 2,,72 Britain's Foreign
Secretary Jack Straw agrees, stating that it is "far preferable" for British suspects
"to come to the United Kingdom and face justice here. 273
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld has been forced to counter the notion of
inhumane treatment, stating "[l]et there be no doubt the treatment of the detainees
in Guantanamo Bay is proper, it's humane, it's appropriate and it is fully consistent
with international conventions." 274 Those provisions include, "8-by-8-by-7.5-foot
holding units... warm showers, toilets, water, clean clothes, blankets, regular and
culturally appropriate meals, prayer mats and the right to practice their religion,
modem medical attention, exercise, writing materials and visits by the
International Committee of the Red Cross. ' 275 According to Secretary Rumsfeld,
"the United States is treating them-all detainees-consistently with the principles
of the Geneva Convention.' 276
4.

Prosecuting the Detainees Internationally May Preserve the U.S.' Ability
to Protect U.S. Citizens Detained Abroad

"[Tihere is a real question about whether this doesn't expose US. citizens to
greater risk of secret trials overseas... It will be very hardfor the US.277to argue
that defendants in all countriesshould be treatedas they are in the US."
Another concern is that the existence of this alternate judicial system itself
may impact the U.S.' ability to protect U.S. citizens arrested and tried abroad. 278
That is, applying here what amounts to a bifurcated legal system may eliminate
protections currently afforded U.S. citizens abroad. The State Department's
criticism of such military tribunals in countries like Russia, China, Egypt, Peru and
Columbia, while not causing legal reform, has provided "leverage" in assisting
Americans facing such trials in foreign lands. 279 U.S. citizen Lori Berenson is
currently appealing a 20-year sentence handed down by a Peruvian court for
collaborating with leftist rebels in a plot to attack Peru's Congress. 280 Berenson
was convicted by military tribunal in 1996.281 Were the U.S. to back her arguments
that her rights were "violated in a sham trial that relied on shoddy evidence," 292 it
is likely those arguments would create little leverage as the U.S. itself has put forth
procedures for conducting similar trials.
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Domestic Pressures Militate Against the Use of Domestic Military
Tribunals

Some cracks may be developing in high-level U.S. support for prosecuting al
Qaeda members at Camp X-Ray. The U.S. State Department has recommended
that President Bush consider reclassifying the al Qaeda militants as prisoners of
war. 28 3 In a remarkable turn of events, Secretary of State Colin Powell asked
President Bush to reverse his stance on the status of the al Qaeda members.28 4
Powell argued that the Geneva Convention "does apply to both al-Qaida and the
Taliban... however [the] fighters could be determined not to be prisoners of
war... but only on a case-by-case basis following individual hearings before a
military board.

28 5

However, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales has flatly

rejected such argument, stating that "the arguments for reconsideration and
reversal are unpersuasive. '2 6 Secretary of State Powell later retracted his
statement, stating "all of us in the administration are united in the view that they
are not deserving of prisoner of war status. 287 He did, however, state that a final
determination was yet to be made:
There is a question that we are examining, and it is a difficult question, and that is
the legal application of the Geneva Convention. This is a new kind of conflict. It
is a new world, but at the same time, we want to make sure that everybody
understands we are a nation of law, abiding by our international obligations. And
so we are examining very carefully and have been for a number of days now, the
exact applicability
or lack of applicability to the Geneva Convention to the
288
detainees.
Thus, the current political view leaves the detainees' status indeterminate, and
the political forces remain divided even at the highest levels. This author submits
that such discord points to a fundamental rift in the current Administration,
between those who find that the human rights value outweighs the desire for
retribution, and those who do not.

283. See Kelly Wallace & Andrea Koppell, Bush Advisors Debate Detainees Status, CNN, Jan. 26,
2002, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/01/26/ret.powell.detainees/index.html (last visited Jan. 27,

2002).
284. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Powell Asks Bush to Reverse Stand on War Captives, N.Y. TIMES
NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 27, 2002.

285. Seelye, supra note 284
286. Id.
287. See Colin L. Powell, Statement on President Bush's Budget Request for FY 2003, available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rmV2002/7806pf.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
288. Id.

2002

PROSECUTING AL QAEDA

B. The Arguments DisfavoringProsecutingal Qaeda Under International
Tribunals
1.

The Death Penalty

Military tribunals have a long history of imposing the death penalty.2 89 In the
instant situation, the emotional desire to impose the death penalty as a means of
retribution is obvious. However, were the detainees to be prosecuted under ad hoc
international tribunals of the type formed by the United Nations Security Counsel
in the mid-1990s, the death penalty would not be a sentencing option. 290 The
reasons underlying that restriction also apply to prosecution by the ICC. 29'
Historically, however, the death penalty was used in the international military
tribunals formed after World War 11.292 Following that precedent, the death penalty
therefore becomes an option only if the detainees are tried under a military
tribunal. International military tribunals are unlikely to be formed because foreign
nations were not specifically targeted in the attacks, even though al Qaeda
militants have been arrested internationally. Additionally, were the forming of
international military tribunals raised, it can be surmised that the U.S. would not
participate because the death penalty would not be a likely sentencing option.
Thus, the death penalty only becomes a realistic option if the al Qaeda militants are
prosecuted by "domestic" military tribunals.293
2.

Ensuring a High Conviction Rate

The possibility that relinquishing control of the detainees to an international
military tribunal may result in low conviction rates, may provide support for the
domestic military trial of al Qaeda militants. Following World War I, the
difficulties that surrounded the Allied attempts to try Germans for war crimes led
to the Supreme Court of the Reich at Leipzig becoming authorized to conduct
military trials.2 94 Of forty-five cases submitted, twelve individuals were tried, and
six convicted.295
While the low conviction rate may have been due to the empowering of a
German court to try Germans, this low conviction rate left the Allied powers
unsatisfied. The end result was that the Allies decided to conduct the trials
themselves under Articles 228 through 230 of the Versailles Treaty. 296 The
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bespeak the benefit of their use. According to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
297
Wolfowitz, convictions were found inroughly eighty-five percent of cases.
3.

The Protection of America, and the American Psyche

Another argument supporting the use of domestic military tribunals is that
tribunals "are extensions of the military campaign, 298 and as such, may prevent
future attacks by either imprisoning terrorism leaders, or by the attendant fear of
prosecution or of the death penalty. Some argue that this extension of the military
campaign will preserve the American psyche:
Farming out our judicial interests for the 'global good' would set the terrible
precedent that we do not have the sovereign right as a nation to capture and try
people who have murdered or plan to murder our innocent citizens. Whatever
damage military tribunals do to our intemational reputation, we risk far greater
damage to our national psyche if non-citizen terrorists are allowed to exploit our
system and our national pain in prolonged and costly courtroom dramas.
In counterargument, a nation of law chooses to live by that rule. Once such a
nation crosses the threshold into possessing a mindset which selectively provides
for that rule of law, the very definition of a nation ruled by law becomes
weakened. A slippery slope may develop, one in which it becomes difficult to
determine when the rule of law applies, and when it doesn't. We have already seen
the waffling that has occurred over whether the international definition of a
prisoner of war applies to al Qaeda. While the definition may not strictly apply, the
penumbra of debate surrounding the issue suggests validity in the public's notion
that it clearly should apply.
4.

The Protection of Classified Information and Court Personnel

Prosecuting terrorists in any forum may bring danger to involved parties. One
argument is that the security inherent to a military tribunal mitigates any such
worry: "ordinary criminal trials would subject court personnel, jurors, and other
civilians to the threat of terrorist reprisals; the military is better suited to coping
with these dangers. '000 Additionally, prosecuting the detainees in front of a
military tribunal will protect classified information or informants involved in that
prosecution effort, as "[clommissions enable the government to protect classified
and other sensitive national-security information that would have to be disclosed
publicly before an Article III court." 30 1 Also, the U.S. may have a fundamental
interest in protecting sources, methods of interdiction, observation and the like,
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which would be on public display were such trials moved into an international
venue.
VI. CONCLUSION

"These individuals were brought out of their county in shackles, drugged,
gagged and blindfolded, and are being held in open-air cages
30 2 in Cuba...
Someone should be assertingtheir rights under internationallaw."
These are trying times. Both logically and emotionally, the reasons behind the
desire to conduct military tribunals are understandable-many, many lives were
lost as a result of the tragic events surrounding September 1 lth. However, by
conducting such trials, the U.S. may be ceding the moral high ground, and
materially limiting its future foreign policy stance and the ability to curtail foreign
human rights abuses.
The tribunals empowered under President Bush's Military Order are the exact
types of trials that the U.S. openly condemns in the international community.
Under President Bush's military tribunal plan, there is no right to counsel during
interrogation, defendants may be convicted based upon a "probative value" not a
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, unanimous verdicts are not required, and
the sentences meted out may be severe, up to and including life imprisonment or
even death. Conducting trials as approved by the Military Order and under
procedures established by Order No. 1 will preclude the U.S. from arguing against
the use of such trials by other nations. The U.S. should preserve the moral high
ground by moving these trials into the international arena.
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